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Abstract
In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference
where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent’s cost
is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize
the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. We design a deterministic
strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 2.75, improving upon
the earlier best ratio of n/2 + 1 [41].
1 Introduction
Facility location games have been studied extensively in recent years. In the general setting,
an authority adopts a mechanism to decide where to place the facilities in the existence of par-
ticipating agents with their reported locations or preferences. The authority aims to minimize
the social cost on the condition that agents will not gain by misreporting their information.
This property is called strategyproofness. The cost of an agent is defined as his distance to the
facility. In the most classic setting for single facility on a line and private location information,
the median mechanism is strategyproof and minimizes the social cost [28]. Procaccia and Ten-
nenholtz introduced the setting for two-facility location games and initiated the approximate
mechanism design for facility location games [31]. In this two-facility model, an agent’s cost
is his distance to the closer facility. Unlike the single facility setting, the optimality no longer
coincides with strategyproofness in this model. They proved constant lower bound for the
approximation ratio and provide a strategyproof mechanism with linear O(n) approximation
ratio. This left a huge gap for the tight ratio. Lu et al. obtained a randomized mechanism
which achieves a constant approximation ratio of 4 and proved a linear lower bound Ω(n) for
all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms [23].
In their model, two facilities are identical and an agent is interested in the one closer to
him. For two heterogeneous facilities, some agent may only accept one of them and the cost is
his distance to that particular one. Of course, if every agent is only interested in one of them, it
becomes two separate single facility games and not interesting. The interesting setting is that
some agents are interested in both facilities while others are interested in only one of them, and
these preferences are agents’ private information. In general, an agent’s cost is his distance to
the closest facility in his acceptable set. This heterogeneous facilities model was proposed in
[41]. To study the effect of private preference, they assumed that the location information is
public in this new model. This is also a more realistic model since in many real facility location
applications, agents’ locations can be publicly verified.
∗City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China. minming.li@cityu.edu.hk
†ITCS, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China. lu.pinyan@mail.shufe.edu.cn
‡University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China. yaoyuhao15@mails.ucas.ac.cn
§Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China. University of Chinese
Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China. zhangjialin@ict.ac.cn
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
08
91
8v
1 
 [c
s.D
S]
  2
1 J
ul 
20
19
In their paper, they proved a lower bound of 2 and provided a strategyproof mechanism
with linear O(n) approximation ratio. This again left a huge gap for the tight ratio. It is also
not clear whether there is a similar large gap between randomized and deterministic mechanisms
as the homogeneous two-facility setting.
Besides its application relevance, the facility location game is also a very important play-
ground for the theory of strategyproof mechanisms without money. Due to the remarkable
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [3] and Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorem [19][32],
the space of strategyproof mechanisms is very limited. Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility
theorem states that any strategyproof social choice function onto a set of alternatives with at
least three options is a dictatorship in the general preference domain. Basically, there are only
two types of strategyproof mechanisms: dictatorship or majority voting of two options. The
median mechanism is neither of them. The existence of such non trivial strategyproof mecha-
nisms is due to single-peaked preference structure of the problem. Due to this, single-peaked
preference is an important direction in the study of strategyproof mechanisms without money.
Studying other variants of facility location games may lead to the discovery of other interesting
preference structures and non trivial strategyproof mechanisms. In most extended version of
facility location games, the proposed strategyproof mechanisms are some versions (maybe ran-
domized) of dictatorship, a majority voting of two boundary options or things like that. The
proportional mechanism from Lu et al. [23] is one notably nontrivial example. But this one only
satisfies a weaker version of strategyproofness, namely strategyproofness in expectation. This
might be the reason why there is a huge gap between randomized and deterministic mechanisms.
It would be more interesting if there are other nontrivial deterministic mechanisms.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we design a novel strategyproof mechanism which achieves an approximation ratio
of 2.75. This asymptotically resolves the problem of the two heterogeneous facilities game. Our
mechanism is very simple. We first ignore agents’ preferences and assume that both facilities are
acceptable for each agent. We then, purely based on the public location information, compute
the optimal locations of two facilities, which we call s` and sr. On a line, the optimal location
can be computed in polynomial time. Then among four possible locations of the two facilities
(s`, s`), (s`, sr), (sr, s`), (sr, sr), we choose the one with the minimum social cost based on
agents’ reported preferences.
Our mechanism is deterministic and very simple but at the same time highly non-trivial
in the sense that its strategyproofness requires an interesting argument. It does not belong to
the two exception families of Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorem. The reason for the
median mechanism being strategyproof is the single-peaked preference. It is an interesting open
direction to figure out what kind of preference structure makes our mechanism strategyproof.
This may lead to a generalized version of our mechanism, which works for a family of problems.
We also studied a natural extension of our mechanism for the facility location game with
three or more facilities. We provide an example to show that the mechanism is no longer
strategyproof. This is similar to what happens in the proportional mechanism [23], whose
three-facility version is no longer strategyproof. It is an interesting open question to extend our
result to the facility location game with three or more facilities. We note that the same problem
for homogeneous facilities remains open after almost a decade.
1.2 Related works
There are two major perspectives to approach the facility location game, namely, characterizing
strategyproof mechanisms and designing strategyproof mechanisms. The classic agent prefer-
ence for facility location games on a line is a special case of single-peaked preference for which
Moulin [28] characterized all the anonymous, strategyproof and efficient mechanisms and at the
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same time showed that median mechanism is strategyproof for minimizing social cost. This is
the pioneering work in the field. Later on, more characterizations are studied on networks [33],
for two facilities [17] and for double-peaked preference [15]. There are also characterizations for
other variants of facility location games.
When optimality no longer coincides with strategyproofness, Procaccia and Tennenholtz
initiated the approximate mechanism design for facility location games [31]. Since then, facility
location games are enriched from many different perspectives.
In terms of preference of agents for a single facility, Cheng et al. [9] initiated obnoxious
facility location games where agents want to be far away from the facility, followed by [20][30][27].
[43] and [13] studied dual preference where agents have different preferences towards the single
facility. Filos-Ratsikas et al. [15] studied double-peaked preference.
In terms of the agents’ cost function with respect to the distance to the facility, besides
linear functions, there are also other functions studied. For example, threshold based linear
function [26], agent dependent linear function (happiness) [25] and concave function [18].
In terms of social objective, besides the mostly studied social cost/utility and maximum
cost/utility, there are also other objectives studied like sum of square of distances[14][27], dif-
ference of maximum distance and minimum distance (envy) [5].
The studies on heterogeneous facilities was initiated by Serafino and Ventre[34][35], where
the cost of an agent who likes both facilities is the sum of the distances to both facilities.
When the cost is only affected by the closer facility or the farther facility, it is called optional
preference and is studied by [41]. Recently fractional preference is studied by [16], where the
cost is a weighted sum of the two distances. There are also works setting a distance constraint
between the two facilities, either maximum distance [43][6] or minimum distance [12].
For other metric spaces, Alon et al. [1] and Cheng et al. [10] studied networks. Lu et al.
[23] studied Euclidean space where a 4-approximated randomized strategyproof mechanism is
proposed.
There are also recent works on capacitated facility location games [4], dynamic facility
location games [21][40], facility location games with externality [22] and facility location games
with dual roles [7] where agents also share the role of facilities and payment is introduced to
deal with a non-standard utility model.
More works could be found in [29][2][11][24][36][39][42][37][38][8].
2 Preliminaries
There are n agents on a line and the government is to build two facilities (named as F1 and F2)
for agents. Agent i is located at xi and has a preference pi ∈ {{F1}, {F2}, {F1, F2}}. (Without
loss of generality, we assume x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ... ≤ xn.) Here, we call x = {x1, x2, ..., xn} as location
profile and p = {p1, p2, ..., pn} as preference profile.
In this model, we define the distance between two points s and t as dist(s, t) = |s− t|.
Given that F1 is built at y1 and F2 is built at y2, we define cost of the agent i as
costx,p,i(y1, y2) = mink:Fk∈pi dist(xi, yk). Then, the social cost is defined as COSTx,p(y1, y2)
=
∑n
i=1 costx,p,i(y1, y2).
In this model, the government uses a mechanism to decide the places to build the facilities.
More specifically, a mechanism takes a location profile x and a preference profile p as input and
outputs facilities’ locations.
Given that an agent might misreport his preference, which will lead to a different output
by the mechanism and might lower his own cost, the government needs to design a strategyproof
mechanism to avoid this situation.
3
Definition 1. (strategyproof)
A mechanism M is strategyproof if M has the following property:
For any location and preference profile x and p, any agent i does not have incentive to
misreport his preference. That is to say if the agent i cheats by misreporting his preference as
p′i and the preference profile changes to p’ = {p1, p2, ..., pi−1, p′i, pi+1, ..., pn}, then there must
be costx,p,i(M(x,p)) ≤ costx,p,i(M(x,p’)).
Given that no strategyproof mechanism achieves the minimum social cost [41], we use
approximation ratio to evaluate the performance of mechanisms.
Definition 2. (approximation ratio)
A mechanism M is α-approximated if for any location and preference profile x and p,
COSTx,p(M(x,p)) ≤ α ·miny1,y2 COSTx,p(y1, y2).
3 Our Strategyproof Mechanism
In this section, we introduce our mechanism and prove its strategyproofness. In Section 4, we
will analyze its approximation ratio.
3.1 The mechanism
Mechanism 1. Define preference profile q = {{F1, F2}, {F1, F2}, ..., {F1, F2}}, i.e. every agent
prefers both facilities in the preference profile q. Let location pair (s`, sr) satisfy (s`, sr) =
arg miny1,y2∈{x1,x2,...,xn}COSTx,q(y1, y2). If (y1, y2) which minimizes COSTx,q(y1, y2) is not
unique, we choose the pair with minimum y1 first and then minimum y2. Finally, we output the
pair (f1, f2) = arg miny1,y2∈{s`,sr}COSTx,p(y1, y2). If there are multiple solutions, we choose
our output in this order: (s`, s`), (s`, sr), (sr, s`), (sr, sr).
In the rest of this paper, s` and sr are specified to be the s` and sr calculated in Mechanism
1.
3.2 Strategyproofness
Theorem 1. Mechanism 1 is strategyproof.
Proof. It is easy to see that s` and sr do not rely on agents’ preferences and the two facilities’
locations will always be one among (s`, s`), (s`, sr), (sr, s`) and (sr, sr).
We first prove that the agent whose preference is {F1, F2} will not cheat. Suppose pi =
{F1, F2}. Without loss of generality, we assume that sr is closer to agent i than s`. Therefore,
the only case that agent i has incentive to cheat is that Mechanism 1’s output is (s`, s`). Let p
be the preference profile where no agent cheats and p’ be the preference profile where agent i
misreports his preference as {F1}. Table 1 shows the difference of social cost for p’ and p.
Since Mechanism 1’s output is (s`, s`) for preference profile p, COSTx,p(s`, s`) is the min-
imum among those four social costs for p. By Table 1, it is easy to see that COSTx,p’(s`, s`)
is the minimum among those four social costs for p’. This shows that Mechanism 1’s output
will still be (s`, s`) even if agent i misreports his preference as {F1}. Therefore, agent i has no
incentive to misreport his preference as {F1}. Using the same analysis, we can prove that agent
i has no incentive to misreport his preference as {F2}. Hence, agent i has no incentive to cheat.
We then prove that the agent whose preference is {F1} or {F2} will not cheat. Suppose
that pi = {F1}. (The proof for the agent with preference {F2} is the same.) Without loss of
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(y1, y2) COSTx,p’(y1, y2)− COSTx,p(y1, y2)
(s`, s`) 0
(s`, sr) dist(xi, s`)− dist(xi, sr) ≥ 0
(sr, s`) 0
(sr, sr) 0
Table 1: the difference of social cost for p’ and p
generality, we assume that sr is closer to agent i than s`. Hence, agent i might cheat only when
F1 is built at s`. At this time, F2 may be built at s` or sr. Let p be the preference profile where
no agent cheats, p’ be the preference profile where agent i misreports his preference as {F2}
and p” be the preference profile where agent i misreports his preference as {F1, F2}. Table 2
shows the difference of social cost for p’ and p and for p” and p.
(y1, y2) COSTx,p’(y1, y2)− COSTx,p(y1, y2) COSTx,p”(y1, y2)− COSTx,p(y1, y2)
(s`, s`) 0 0
(s`, sr) dist(xi, sr)− dist(xi, s`) ≤ 0 dist(xi, sr)− dist(xi, s`) ≤ 0
(sr, s`) dist(xi, s`)− dist(xi, sr) ≥ 0 0
(sr, sr) 0 0
Table 2: the difference of social cost for p’ and p and for p” and p
If F2 is built at s` for p, then COSTx,p(s`, s`) ≤ min{COSTx,p(sr, s`), COSTx,p(sr, sr)}.
By Table 2, it is easy to see that COSTx,p’(s`, s`) ≤ min{COSTx,p’(sr, s`), COSTx,p’(sr, sr)}
and COSTx,p”(s`, s`) ≤ min{COSTx,p”(sr, s`), COSTx,p”(sr, sr)}. This means F1 will not be
built at sr even if agent i misreports his preference as {F2} or {F1, F2}.
If F2 is built at sr for p, then COSTx,p(s`, sr) ≤ min{COSTx,p(sr, s`), COSTx,p(sr, sr)}.
By Table 2, it is easy to see that COSTx,p’(s`, sr) ≤ min{COSTx,p’(sr, s`), COSTx,p’(sr, sr)}
and COSTx,p”(s`, sr) ≤ min{COSTx,p”(sr, s`), COSTx,p”(sr, sr)}. Similarly, this means that
agent i’s misreporting will not make F1 closer. Therefore agent i has no incentive to cheat.
4 Analysis on the approximation ratio of Mechanism 1
In this section, we analyze the approximation ratio of Mechanism 1.
We first introduce some lemmas in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we show that Mechanism
1 is 3-approximated. After that, we show how to improve the approximation ratio from 3 to
2.75 in Section 4.3. Finally, in Section 4.4, we show a lower bound of the approximation ratio,
which we conjecture to be the exact approximation ratio of Mechanism 1.
4.1 Preparation
Lemma 1. When analyzing the approximation ratio of Mechanism 1 (denoted as M), we can
assume pi 6= {F1, F2} for every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Proof. Suppose we have a location profile x and a preference profile p with pi = {F1, F2}. Let
(opt1, opt2) be the locations such that COSTx,p(opt1, opt2) = miny1,y2 COSTx,p(y1, y2). Let p
′
i
be {F1} if dist(xi, opt1) < dist(xi, opt2). Otherwise, let p′i be {F2}. Let preference profile p’ =
{p1, p2, ..., pi−1, p′i, pi+1, ..., pn}, i.e. we get p’ by replacing pi with p′i in p.
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We first prove COSTx,p(M(x,p)) ≤ COSTx,p’(M(x,p’)). Since the location profiles in
(x,p) and (x,p’) are the same, (s`, sr) in M(x,p) and M(x,p’) are the same. Note that we have
COSTx,p(y1, y2) ≤ COSTx,p’(y1, y2) for any (y1, y2), since p′i ⊆ pi and other agents’ preferences
are the same. Therefore, we have COSTx,p(y1, y2) ≤ COSTx,p’(y1, y2) for y1, y2 ∈ {s`, sr},
which implies
COSTx,p(M(x,p)) = min
y1,y2∈{s`,sr}
COSTx,p(y1, y2)
≤ min
y1,y2∈{s`,sr}
COSTx,p’(y1, y2)
= COSTx,p’(M(x,p’)).
We then prove miny1,y2 COSTx,p(y1, y2) ≥ miny1,y2 COSTx,p’(y1, y2). By the definition of
p′i, we have COSTx,p’(opt1, opt2) = COSTx,p(opt1, opt2). Therefore, we have
min
y1,y2
COSTx,p’(y1, y2) ≤ COSTx,p’(opt1, opt2)
= COSTx,p(opt1, opt2)
= min
y1,y2
COSTx,p(y1, y2).
Then, COSTx,p’(M(x,p’)) ≤ α·miny1,y2 COSTx,p’(y1, y2) will imply COSTx,p(M(x,p)) ≤
α ·miny1,y2 COSTx,p(y1, y2). By simple induction, if we want to prove that Mechanism 1 is α-
approximated for some α, we only need to consider the situation where no agent’s preference is
{F1, F2}.
Lemma 2. Given a set of points S = {x1, x2, ..., xn} on a line, the median of S, denoted as p,
satisfies
∑n
i=1 dist(xi, p) = miny
∑n
i=1 dist(xi, y).
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward.
Lemma 3. Let preference profile q = {{F1, F2}, {F1, F2}, ..., {F1, F2}}. Then, COSTx,q(s`, sr) ≤
miny1,y2 COSTx,p(y1, y2) holds for any location profile x and preference profile p.
Proof. By [41], we have COSTx,q(s`, sr) = miny1,y2 COSTx,q(y1, y2). Let (opt1, opt2) satisfy
COSTx,p(opt1, opt2) = miny1,y2 COSTx,p(y1, y2). Then we have
COSTx,q(s`, sr) = min
y1,y2
COSTx,q(y1, y2)
≤ COSTx,q(opt1, opt2)
≤ COSTx,p(opt1, opt2)
= min
y1,y2
COSTx,p(y1, y2).
4.2 Analysis of the approximation ratio of 3
We first introduce some notations to simplify the description of later analysis.
Given a location profile x and a preference profile p, by Lemma 1, we can divide all agents
into two sets {i|pi = {F1}} and {i|pi = {F2}}. Let opt1 be the median of S1 = {xi|pi = {F1}}
and opt2 be the median of S2 = {xi|pi = {F2}}. (Note that S1 may have same locations and we
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do not remove them. So does S2.) By Lemma 2, it is easy to see that COSTx,p(opt1, opt2) =
miny1,y2 COSTx,p(y1, y2).
Recall that s` and sr are two locations calculated in Mechanism 1, where s` ≤ sr. We
denote smid as the midpoint of s` and sr.
For point set S and point q, we define d(S, q) =
∑
p∈S dist(p, q). (This definition differs
from the common one where d(S, q) is defined as minp∈S dist(p, q).) We define some notations
as follows.
• COSTk , min{d(Sk, s`), d(Sk, sr)}, k = 1, 2.
COST , COST1 + COST2.
• OPTk , d(Sk, optk), k = 1, 2.
OPT , OPT1 +OPT2.
• BESTk ,
∑
x∈Sk min{dist(x, s`), dist(x, sr)}, k = 1, 2.
BEST , BEST1 +BEST2.
Intuitively, COST is equal to COSTx,p(M(x,p)), i.e. the social cost calculated by Mech-
anism 1. OPT is equal to miny1,y2 COSTx,p(y1, y2), i.e. the minimum social cost for p. BEST
is equal to COSTx,q(s`, sr), i.e. the minimum social cost for q. (q is defined in Mechanism 1
and Lemma 3.) With these notations, Lemma 3 implies BEST ≤ OPT .
Now, we introduce our first result on the approximation ratio of Mechanism 1.
Theorem 2. Mechanism 1 is 3-approximated, i.e. COST ≤ 3 ·OPT .
Proof. To prove the ratio, we try to prove COST − OPT ≤ 2 · BEST . It is sufficient to show
COSTk −OPTk ≤ 2 ·BESTk, k = 1, 2.
By symmetry, we only show COST1 −OPT1 ≤ 2 ·BEST1. We first consider the case that
opt1 lies on the left side of smid. (See Figure 1.) By definition, we have:
COST1 −OPT1 = min{d(S1, s`), d(S1, sr)} − d(S1, opt1)
≤ d(S1, s`)− d(S1, opt1).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the amount of agents is even. Otherwise, we
copy all agents, including both locations and preferences, and add them to the initial set of
agents. It is easy to see that both COST and OPT double. Hence, it does not affect our
analysis on the approximation ratio.
Since opt1 is the median of S1, half of S1 lie on the left side of opt1 (or at opt1) and the
rest lie on the right side of opt1 (or at opt1). We match the points between those two parts in
the way brackets match, which is shown in Figure 1. Finally, those points form |S1|/2 pairs
(uj , vj), where uj is in the first part (left side part) and vj is in the second part (right side part),
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., |S1|/2}.
We consider the case that opt1 lies on the right side of s`, then we have the following
equation for any j ∈ {1, 2, ..., |S1|/2}.
d({uj , vj}, s`)− d({uj , vj}, opt1) =
{
0, uj is on the left side of s`
2 · dist(uj , s`), otherwise
Given that each uj lies on the left side of opt1 and opt1 lies on the left side of smid, we find
s` is closer to uj than sr. By the definition of BEST1, we have
BEST1 =
∑
x∈Si
min{dist(x, s`), dist(x, sr)}
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Figure 1: the case opt1 ≤ smid
≥
|S1|/2∑
j=1
min{dist(uj , s`), dist(uj , sr)}
=
|S1|/2∑
j=1
dist(uj , s`).
Then we have
COST1 −OPT1 ≤ d(S1, s`)− d(S1, opt1)
=
|S1|/2∑
j=1
(d({uj , vj}, s`)− d({uj , vj}, opt1))
=
∑
j:uj is on the right side of s`
2 · dist(uj , s`)
≤
|S1|/2∑
j=1
2 · dist(uj , s`)
≤ 2 ·BEST1.
The analysis for the case that opt1 lies on the left side of s` is similar. Hence, COST1 −
OPT1 ≤ 2 ·BEST1 holds for the case that opt1 lies on the left side of smid.
The case that opt1 lies on the right side of smid can be solved by using the same analysis.
Hence, we have COST1 −OPT1 ≤ 2 ·BEST1.
By Lemma 3, we have COST −OPT ≤ 2 ·BEST ≤ 2 ·OPT . Hence, COST ≤ 3 ·OPT .
4.3 Improvement of approximation ratio from 3 to 2.75
For simplicity of later discussion, let ∆k = (COSTk −OPTk)/2, k = 1, 2 and ∆ = ∆1 + ∆2.
In the previous section, we obtain the approximation ratio 3 by showing ∆k ≤ BESTk,
k = 1, 2. In this section, we will give a tighter upper bound of ∆k depending on the position
of optk. Our intuition comes from the observation that when opt1 is on the left side of s`, we
have ∆1 ≤ 1/2 ·BEST1 (Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 3). We then carefully analyze the case
when opt1 is between s` and smid. The main difficulty happens when opt1 is close to s`, where
in this case, ∆1 can be close to BEST1. Fortunately, we find that in such case, we can bound
∆1 by OPT1. The following obstacle is that although BEST ≤ OPT , there is no relationship
between OPT1 and BEST1. We handle this issue by simultaneously considering ∆1 and ∆2.
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Theorem 3. Mechanism 1 is 2.75-approximated, i.e. COST ≤ 2.75 ·OPT .
Proof. We try to bound ∆1 first. By symmetry, we assume that opt1 is on the left side of smid.
Let sc be the point satisfying dist(sc, smid) = c · dist(s`, sc). Here, c is a constant parameter to
be determined later.
We discuss in the following three cases, according to the position of opt1.
Case 1. opt1 is on the left side of s`.
Figure 2: Case 1. opt1 is on the left side of s`
In this case, we divide S1 into four parts: X1, X2, X3 and X4. (See Figure 2.)
1. X1 contains the points on the left of opt1.
2. X2 contains the points between opt1 and s`.
3. X3 contains the points between s` and smid.
4. X4 contains the points on the right of smid.
We allocate points on the boundary in such a way that |X1| = |X2|+ |X3|+ |X4| (This can
be achieved since opt1 divides S1 into two parts, left part and right part, with the same size).
Using the similar analysis as the proof of Theorem 2 and noticing that opt1 is on the left
side of s`, we find that ∆1 is equal to the distance between s` and points in S1 which lie between
opt1 and s`, i.e. d(X2, s`). Hence, we have
∆1 = d(X2, s`) ≤ |X2| · dist(opt1, s`) ≤ |X1| · dist(opt1, s`) ≤ d(X1, s`).
In this case,
BEST1 = d(X1, s`) + d(X2, s`) + d(X3, s`) + d(X4, sr) ≥ d(X1, s`) + d(X2, s`) ≥ 2 ·∆1.
This means that we have ∆1 ≤ 1/2 ·BEST1.
Case 2. opt1 is between sc and smid.
In this case, we divide S1 into five parts: X1, X2, X3, X4 and X5. (See Figure 3.)
1. X1 contains the points between s` and opt1.
2. X2 contains the points between smid and sr.
3. X3 contains the points between opt1 and smid.
4. X4 contains the points on the left of s`.
5. X5 contains the points on the right of sr.
9
Figure 3: Case 2. opt1 is between sc and smid
Similarly, we can assume |X1|+ |X4| = |X2|+ |X3|+ |X5|.
By the definition of ∆1, using a similar proof as Theorem 2, we have
∆1 = min{d(X1, s`), d(X3, sr) + d(X2, sr)}.
In this case,
BEST1 = d(X1, s`) + d(X2, sr) + d(X3, s`) + d(X4, s`) + d(X5, sr)
≥ d(X1, s`) + d(X2, sr) + d(X3, s`).
Since dist(sc, smid) = c·dist(s`, sc) and dist(s`, smid) = dist(smid, sr), we have dist(sc, sr) =
(2c + 1) · dist(s`, sc). Given that opt1 is on the right side of sc in this case, dist(p, sr) ≤
(2c + 1) · dist(p, s`) holds for every p ∈ X3. Thus, we have d(X3, sr) ≤ (2c + 1) · d(X3, s`).
Hence,
d(X3, sr) + d(X2, sr) ≤ (2c+ 1) · d(X3, s`) + d(X2, sr) ≤ (2c+ 1) · (d(X3, s`) + d(X2, sr)).
If d(X1, s`) ≤ (2c+ 1)/(2c+ 2) ·BEST1, then we have
∆1 ≤ d(X1, s`) ≤ 2c+ 1
2c+ 2
BEST1.
Otherwise, d(X1, s`) > (2c+ 1)/(2c+ 2) ·BEST1. Then, we have
∆1 ≤ d(X3, sr) + d(X2, sr)
≤ (2c+ 1) · (d(X3, s`) + d(X2, sr))
≤ (2c+ 1) · (BEST1 − d(X1, s`))
<
2c+ 1
2c+ 2
BEST1.
Therefore, in this case, we have ∆1 ≤ (2c+ 1)/(2c+ 2) ·BEST1.
Case 3. opt1 is between s` and sc.
In this case, we divide S1 into the same five parts defined in Case 2. (See Figure 4.)
Similar to Case 2, we have
∆1 = min{d(X1, s`), d(X3, sr) + d(X2, sr)},
BEST1 = d(X1, s`) + d(X2, sr) + d(X3, s`) + d(X4, s`) + d(X5, sr).
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Figure 4: Case 3. opt1 is between s` and sc.
Let α be a constant parameter in (0, 1). We will determine the value of α later.
If d(X2, sr) + d(X3, s`) ≥ α · d(X1, s`), we have
BEST1 ≥ d(X1, s`) + d(X2, sr) + d(X3, s`) ≥ (1 + α) · d(X1, s`) ≥ (1 + α) ·∆1.
This means ∆1 ≤ 1/(1 + α) ·BEST1.
Otherwise, we have
α · d(X1, s`) > d(X2, sr) + d(X3, s`)
≥ d(X2, sr) + |X3| · dist(opt1, s`)
≥ d(X2, sr) + |X3||X1| · d(X1, s`).
Now we use OPT1 to bound ∆1. By definition, we have
OPT1 = d(S1, opt1) ≥ d(X2, opt1) + d(X5, opt1).
Note that dist(v, opt1) = dist(opt1, sr)−dist(v, sr) holds for every v ∈ X2 and dist(v, opt1) ≥
dist(opt1, sr) holds for every v ∈ X5. Hence, we have
OPT1 ≥ |X2| · dist(opt1, sr)− d(X2, sr) + |X5| · dist(opt1, sr)
= (|X2|+ |X5|) · dist(opt1, sr)− d(X2, sr)
≥ (|X2|+ |X5|) · 2c+ 1
2c+ 2
· dist(s`, sr)− d(X2, sr).
Note that d(X1, s`) ≤ |X1| · dist(s`, opt1) ≤ |X1| · dist(s`, sr)/(2c+ 2). Hence,
OPT1 ≥ (2c+ 1) · |X2|+ |X5||X1| · d(X1, s`)− d(X2, sr)
≥ (2c+ 1) · |X1| − |X3||X1| · d(X1, s`)− d(X2, sr)
= (2c+ 1) · d(X1, s`)− ((2c+ 1) · |X3||X1| · d(X1, s`) + d(X2, sr))
≥ (2c+ 1) · d(X1, s`)− (2c+ 1)( |X3||X1| · d(X1, s`) + d(X2, sr))
≥ (2c+ 1) · d(X1, s`)− (2c+ 1) · α · d(X1, s`)
= (2c+ 1) · (1− α) · d(X1, s`)
≥ (2c+ 1) · (1− α) ·∆1.
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This means that we have
∆1 ≤ 1
(2c+ 1) · (1− α)OPT1.
Now we summarize those three cases. Let c = 1 and α = 1/(2c+ 1) = 1/3. At least one of
the following will happen:
∆1 ≤ max{1
2
,
2c+ 1
2c+ 2
,
1
1 + α
} ·BEST1 = 3
4
BEST1, or
∆1 ≤ 1
(2c+ 1) · (1− α)OPT1 =
1
2
OPT1.
It is easy to see that we can get the similar bounds for ∆2:
∆2 ≤ 3
4
BEST2 or ∆2 ≤ 1
2
OPT2.
Due to that there is no relationship between OPT1 and BEST1, we consider ∆1 and ∆2
together. Without loss of generality, we assume BEST1 ≥ BEST2. We divide the discussion
into 4 cases:
Case 1: ∆1 ≤ 3/4 ·BEST1, ∆2 ≤ 3/4 ·BEST2. In this case, we have
∆ = ∆1 + ∆2 ≤ 3
4
(BEST1 +BEST2) =
3
4
BEST ≤ 3
4
OPT.
Case 2: ∆1 ≤ 1/2 ·OPT1, ∆2 ≤ 1/2 ·OPT2. In this case, we have
∆ = ∆1 + ∆2 ≤ 1
2
(OPT1 +OPT2) =
1
2
OPT.
Case 3: ∆1 ≤ 1/2 ·OPT1, ∆2 ≤ 3/4 ·BEST2. In this case, we have
∆ = ∆1 + ∆2
≤ 1
2
OPT1 +
3
4
BEST2
≤ 1
2
OPT +
3
8
BEST
≤ 7
8
OPT.
Case 4: ∆1 ≤ 3/4 ·BEST1, ∆2 ≤ 1/2 ·OPT2. In this case, we have
∆ = ∆1 + ∆2
≤ 3
4
BEST1 +BEST2
≤ 3
4
BEST1 +
1
8
BEST1 +
7
8
BEST2
=
7
8
BEST
≤ 7
8
OPT.
It is easy to see that ∆ ≤ 7/8 · OPT holds for all these four cases. Therefore, we have
COST −OPT = 2 ·∆ ≤ 2 · 7/8 ·OPT = 7/4 ·OPT , i.e. COST ≤ 2.75 ·OPT .
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4.4 A lower bound of the approximation ratio of Mechanism 1
We provide a lower bound for the approximation ratio of Mechanism 1.
Let N be a positive integer. Let N agents be located at x = 0 with preference {F1},
b(1 +√2)Nc agents be located at x = 1 with preference {F1} and almost infinite (far greater
than N) agents be located at x =
√
2 with preference {F2}. It is easy to see that (s`, sr) will be
(0,
√
2). Note that the minimum social cost is N while the social cost calcuted by Mechanism 1
is min(b(1 +√2)Nc,√2N + b(1 +√2)Nc(√2− 1)). When N increases to infinity, the ratio of
social cost by Mechanism 1 to the minimum social cost approaches 1 +
√
2. Therefore, 1 +
√
2
is a lower bound of the approximation ratio of Mechanism 1.
We conjecture that the exact approximation ratio of Mechanism 1 is 1 +
√
2.
5 Generalization
We have tried to generalize our mechanism to k facilities (k ≥ 3). Our generalized mechanism
first ignores agents’ preferences and assumes all facilities are acceptable for each agent. Then
it only uses the location profile to calculate the optimal locations of all k facilities, which we
denote as s1, s2, ..., sk. Finally, the mechanism enumerates Fi’s location being at sj , k
k cases in
total, and chooses the one that minimizes the social cost.
However, unfortunately, this generalized mechanism is not strategyproof when there are
more than two facilities. We give an example to show that this mechanism is not able to
prevent agents from misreporting their preferences when there are three facilities.
Example 1. Assume that l1 and l2 are two positive numbers satisfying 2l2 < l1 < 3l2. Let
• two agents whose preferences are {F2} be located at x = 0,
• one agent whose preference is {F2} be located at x = l1 − l2,
• one agent whose preference is {F2} be located at x = l1,
• one agent whose preference is {F2, F3} be located at x = l1 + l2,
• almost infinite agents whose preferences are {F1} be located at x = 0,
• almost infinite agents whose preferences are {F3} be located at x = 2l1 + l2.
Figure 5: An example which shows the generalized mechanism is not strategyproof
It is easy to see that if we use the generalized mechanism on this input, (s1, s2, s3) will be
(0, l1, 2l1 + l2). (See Figure 5.) The almost infinite agents at s1 with preferences {F1} force F1
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to be built at s1. (Otherwise, the social cost will be almost infinite.) For the same reason, F3
will be built at s3.
If all agents report their true preferences, then F2 will be built at s1. However, if the agent
at l1 + l2 (with preference {F2, F3}) misreports his preference as {F2}, then F2 will be built at
s2 and the cost of this agent will decrease from l1 to l2. Therefore, this generalized mechanism
fails to prevent this agent from misreporting his preference.
In this example, we find that the social cost will increase if F2 is still built at s1 after the
agent at l1 + l2 misreports his preference. However, this situation will not happen when there
are only two facilities because the mechanism chooses the facilities’ locations only between two
locations s` and sr. That is the reason why the mechanism is strategyproof when there are only
two facilities but not strategyproof for three facilities.
Consider the facility location game with k facilities, where k > 3. For every i ∈ {4, 5, ..., k},
we add almost infinite agents whose locations are x = (i − 1) · l1 + l2 and preferences are
{Fi} to the example above. It is easy to see that the new example shows that the generalized
mechanism is not strategyproof when there are k facilities. Hence, this generalized mechanism
is not strategyproof for the facility location game with more than two facilities.
6 Conclusion
To summarize, we have designed a strategyproof mechanism whose approximation ratio is no
more than 2.75 and no less than 1 +
√
2. It is an open question whether the exact approxima-
tion ratio of this mechanism is 1 +
√
2. Furthermore, the bounds for approximation ratios of
strategyproof mechanisms for two facilities do not match yet.
Besides, it is also an interesting open question to design a strategyproof mechanism with
constant approximation ratio for the facility location game with three or more facilities.
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